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The purpose of this paper is to show that, pace (Field, 2009), MacFarlane’s assessment
relativism and expressivism should be sharply distinguished. We do so by arguing
that relativism and expressivism exemplify two very different approaches to context-
dependence. Relativism, on the one hand, shares with other contemporary approaches
a bottom–up, building block, model, while expressivism is part of a different tradition,
one that might include Lewis’ epistemic contextualism and Frege’s content individuation,
with which it shares an organic model to deal with context-dependence. The building-
block model and the organic model, and thus relativism and expressivism, are set apart
with the aid of a particular test: only the building-block model is compatible with the idea
that there might be analytically equivalent, and yet different, propositions.
Keywords: context-dependence, assessment relativism, expressivism, Frege, pragmatism, compositionality,
principle of context
INTRODUCTION
MacFarlane (2014, p. 172) has recently claimed that his own kind of relativism and contemporary
expressivism, more speciﬁcally the one defended by Allan Gibbard, use ‘essentially the same
compositional semantics.’ This claim, despite being accurate concerning the semantic value of
the speciﬁc sentences that McFarlane’s focuses on, might blur a fundamental diﬀerence between
the expressivist analysis and other semantic approaches. Expressivism, we will argue, is in general
compatible with standard compositional semantics, but its basic take on how propositional
contents are individuated concedes priority not to the principle of compositionality, but rather
to the principle of context. Under expressivism, content is individuated by the inferential import,
and thus the compositionalist – building-block – order of explanation is challenged.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we will contrast two diﬀerent models to accommodate
context-dependence—the idea that explaining our linguistic practices requires both linguistic and
contextual information. The building-blockmodel, on the one hand, and the organicmodel, on the
other, can be set apart by taking into consideration whether they give prominence to the principle
of compositionality over the principle of context, or the other way around. Second, we will argue
that expressivism, unlike relativism and other competitors, ﬁts snugly under the latter, organic,
model. Third, we will propose a test to determine whether a given theory belongs to the building-
block or the organic model – if it is possible for a theory to accommodate the idea that there
are analytically equivalent propositions that nevertheless diﬀer, then this theory belongs to the
compositional group. According to this test, the analytic equivalence test, assessment relativism
belongs to the building-block model, while expressivism remains an alternative for advocates of
the organic model.
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CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE: THE
BUILDING-BLOCK SPECTRUM
Almost no theory of meaning available aspires to explain
our meaningful communicative exchanges in a way that is
completely independent from contextual considerations. An
elaborate example of this extreme viewmight be Stojanovic’swhat
is said (Stojanovic, 2007), where content is explicitly designed
to be neutral with respect to context-dependent parameters. At
one level or another, though, most theories of meaning assume
that whatever we can say about the meaning of a string of
symbols, as viewed in isolation, diﬀers from what a normal
speaker would say while uttering it, or an audience would get
while understanding it.
Under the building-block model, meaning’s order of
explanation proceeds in successive stages, starting from the
most basic considerations, and building up from them. At any
level, information from the context might be acknowledged by
diﬀerent theoretical alternatives. Here there are some examples.
With speech-act pluralism Cappelen and Lepore (2005)
claim to put forward ‘insensitive’ semantics, meaning context
independent, but they move most contextual eﬀects to the realm
of pragmatics, making the communicated information ultimately
dependent on the context. Some other “minimalist” alternatives
include in the semantic content only the contextual information
that is retrieved with the aid of the linguistic meaning of certain
expressions, such as indexicals (Stanley, 2000). Sometimes
contextual information is meant to have both an impact on
what is said as well as on what is globally communicated.
Pragmatic explanations of the opacity of belief reports tend
to exhibit this feature (see Salmon, 1986, but also Saul, 1998).
These theoretical alternatives thus concede a place to contextual
information, but are not usually dubbed ‘contextualists,’ because
they explain in a context-independent way speakers’ intuitions
about the truth of what is said. Contextualists, on the other
hand, explain our semantic intuitions by appealing to contextual
information.
Within the realm of contextualism, indexical and non-
indexical contextualism (cfr. MacFarlane, 2007, 2014) should
be distinguished both from Truth-Conditional Contextualism
(cfr. Recanati, 2010) and Relevance Theory (Carston, 2002).
‘Indexical contextualism’ is the general label for views according
to which the context aﬀects the semantic value of the
subsentential linguistic items. Non-indexical contextualism, by
contrast, restricts certain contextual processes to the realm of
post-semantics. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics and Relevance
Theory are instances of “radical contextualism” (Searle, 1992;
cfr. Recanati, 2002, p. 303) – whose central motto is that there
is no truth-evaluable level of meaning which is unaﬀected by
contextual information.
Assessment relativism (MacFarlane, 2014) recognizes the
impact of contextual information on our intuitions about the
truth of what we say, but makes it so that some contextual
information can be accessible only from a particular context –
that of assessment. On occasions, it is not the context in which
the sentence is uttered that matters, but the context in which the
utterance is received. This type of context-dependence is usually
set apart from the aforementioned versions of contextualism,
even if it has been argued that the alleged beneﬁts of this view—
specially those concerning disagreement—can be accommodated
within enhanced contextualist approaches (see, e.g., Kölbel, 2009;
Lopez de Sa, 2015, but also Marques and Garcia-Carpintero,
2014; Marques, 2015). At times, it has even been conﬂated with
certain context-dependent approaches (expressivist approaches)
whose starting point seems to be quite distant from the building-
block model (vid. Field, 2009, p. 2521, but cf. Yalcin, 2011, p. 327).
We will show in the third section of this paper that assessment
relativism truly belongs to the building-block model, and in doing
so we will be able to establish a principled diﬀerence between this
form of context-dependence and another common alternative,
i.e., expressivism.
This quick list is by no means intended to be exhaustive;
it is meant only to show the spectrum within which diﬀerent
takes on context-dependence can be accommodated. Whether
we admit only a minimal amount of contextual information, or
we are radical contextualists, we form part of the building-block
model if contextual information enters a step-by-step process of
meaning construction that starts from the meanings associated
with subsentential components, to arrive at a later stage to a
complete content.
Depending on the stage at which contextual information has
an impact, pragmatic processes under the building-block model
might be:
Prelinguistic. Input: unsegmented marks or sounds, not
recognized as signs belonging to a language. Output: a piece of
discourse.
Lexical. Output: a univocal string of words. Take ‘I saw
her duck under the table’; only after ‘duck’ is interpreted,
either as a verb or a noun, do we proceed to the following
stage.
Syntactic. Output: a univocal structure. Compare ‘every ball
has a red dot on it,’ and ‘every kid at school has a pet.’ The second
sentence exhibits a syntactic ambiguity. Even though a single red
dot cannot be on every ball, every kid in the school can be truly
said to have a pet if either they are given a diﬀerent pet for every
diﬀerent kid, or they all treat the school turtle as their very own
pet.
Pre-semantic. Output: a univocal set of meanings-cum-
structure. Reference ﬁxing for indexicals and semantic
disambiguation are commonly assumed to require contextual
information.
Semantic. Output: a proposition. Quantiﬁer domain
restriction (see Stanley and Szabó, 2000), modulation
(see Recanati, 2004, passim, see for instance p. 136 and
ﬀ.), etc. are typically associated with local pragmatic
processes.
Post-semantic. Output: a proposition plus a circumstance of
evaluation. Typically associated with global processes.
1“What I’m advocating for normative terms is very diﬀerent from contextual
relativism, so diﬀerent that in my 1994 paper I decided not to call it ‘relativism’
at all, and to label it a kind of expressivism (though one very diﬀerent from old-
fashioned versions of expressivism, in that it gives evaluative statements a cognitive
role). But MacFarlane (2007) has recently introduced the term ‘assessor-relativism’
for what seems at ﬁrst blush to be just this sort of thing” (Field, 2009, p. 252).
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Pragmatic. Output: multiple propositions. Secondary
inferential processes, for the most part taken to be not
sub-personal. Implicatures.
Depending on the way in which contextual information is
accounted for, pragmatic processes might be:
Primary/secondary. For theories that defend a principled
distinction between the semantic core of our utterances and other
levels of meaning conveyed, primary pragmatic processes will be
those aﬀecting the semantic core, what is said, and secondary
pragmatic processes will derive other layers of propositional
content inferentially from what is said plus other contextual
considerations. The latter will typically have an impact at the
pragmatic level, even though interactions with other, lower levels
are recognized by some approaches, such as Relevance Theory.
Local/global. Local pragmatic processes have an impact on
subsentential phrases, global pragmatic processes modify the
circumstances of evaluation, placing the whole sentence, as it
were, in a diﬀerent light to be evaluated. These are usually
identiﬁed at the post-semantic level.
Mandatory/optional. A pragmatic process is mandatory if its
intervention is necessary in order to arrive to a level of content
that can be evaluated as true or false. Otherwise, it is optional.
Mandatory∗/optional∗ . A pragmatic process is mandatory∗
if its intervention is “recruited” by the linguistic meaning of
a lexical item, as occurs in the sentence. Otherwise, it is
optional∗ . Indexicals trigger mandatory∗ pragmatic processes.
These processes are also sometimes deemed ‘bottom–up’ vs.
‘top–down’ processes.
Context-dependence under the building-block model covers
the vast majority of theories of meaning in the market. So much
so that it is often forgot that there are alternatives to this spectrum
of theories. Within this model, contextual information ﬁnds its
way into the explanation of linguistic communication as part
of a progressive building process. But, as we will see in the
following section, there are well-known semantic alternatives that
exhibit a completely diﬀerent kind of context-dependence. This
form of context-dependence might look alien to some, but it
is exempliﬁed by among the best-known theoretical approaches
of the analytical tradition. As we will see, the basic insight of
this alternative approach was shared by Frege and David Lewis,
to mention only two well-known examples. Under the organic
model context plays a truly preeminent role. Putting context ﬁrst
is what Frege, Lewis, and others did, and it is also part of the
agenda put forward by contemporary expressivism2.
2An argument could be made to the eﬀect that Relevance Theory does actually
belong to the theories grouped under the “organic model” label. Within Relevance
Theory, individuation of content is performed with the aid of the presumption
of optimal relevance – the cognitive impact of an utterance needs to match the
eﬀort that is required to interpret it. As the cognitive impact of an utterance is
established with respect to the status of the audience’s belief box at the time of
the utterance, whether the presumption of optimal relevance is upheld can only
be determined by paying attention to the whole judgment, instead of its sub-
sentential components. Moreover, Relevance Theory acknowledges the existence
of top–down pragmatic processes, even acting from the level of implicatures, with
an impact on the explicature. These reasons, the presumption of optimal relevance
as a guiding principle for content individuation and the existence of top–down
pragmatic processes, could be suﬃcient to persuade some of the idea that Relevance
Theory is unfairly listedwithin the building-blockmodel theories. Tempting as this
might be, we think that this inclination must be resisted, for the following reason:
PROPOSITIONAL PRIORITY AND THE
ORGANIC MODEL
In the organic model, content individuation is not an issue of
assembling pieces into a particular shape. Rather, the basic unit
of analysis has to be able to move the chain on the conversational
scoreboard, and thus the analysis should take as primitive only
linguistic units that can be used to acquire certain inferential
commitments. Context is not needed to ﬁll in the holes left in
the logical form by semantic underdetermination, but rather to
supply the information that is needed to make sense of a certain
communicative exchange.
Dealing with contextual information organically requires
being able to apply the contribution of the context to the
content expressed, and this in a way that cannot be speciﬁed
by taking into account how the linguistic meaning of the
subsentential bits becomes modiﬁed when introduced in that
particular situation, only to be afterward assembled in a
meaningful whole. As we saw in the previous section, whether
we take the contextual information to be gathered with the
aid of linguistic instructions – through mandatory∗ pragmatic
processes, or freely – as the result of optional∗ processes, or
secondary pragmatic processes, the building-block model would
always proceed from subsentential units to a whole proposition.
The organic model needs to start from a completely diﬀerent
stance. No longer would it suﬃce to check how the contextual
information bears upon the particular meaning of the phrases as
they are currently used, a large amount of contextual information
can also have an impact on the content which cannot be
domesticated into the modulation of some pieces of the whole.
The starting point of the organic model is the content of
judgments, whatever we can put forward as a premise or a
conclusion, what we stand for and become responsible for in a
conversation.
In communicative acts the immediate data are contents of
propositional nature, expressed by sentences. These contents
are individuated within a given context, and this makes
the organic model context-dependent, even though context
provides information in a way that cannot be equated to
those mentioned above. To “move the chain,” agents have to
perform some kind of act, since acts are the minimal moves in
the communicative game. Brandom gave ﬂesh to this classical
pragmatist intuition: ‘sentences are the kind of expression whose
freestanding utterance [. . .] has the pragmatic signiﬁcance of
performing a speech act’ (Brandom, 2001, p. 125). ‘Without
expressions of this category,’ Brandom went on, ‘there can be
no speech acts of any kind, and hence no speciﬁcally linguistic
practice’ (loc.cit). Both logically and chronologically, rational
agents’ ﬁrst contact with language is somebody saying something.
Only afterward is the identiﬁcation of words and structures
available.
the sheer distinction between bottom–up and top–down pragmatic processes only
makes sense within a building-block background. Relevance Theory’s commitment
with a logical form that gets enriched with diﬀerent components was essential
to the position as it was introduced, and continues to be part of the standard
description of the theory (Carston, 2000, p. 10; Clark, 2013, p. 305; Romero and
Soria, 2014, p. 490).
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Lewis’ epistemic contextualism (Lewis, 1996) is a well-known
example of an organic use of contextual information. His view
cannot be forced into any of the building-block varieties of
context-dependence introduced in the ﬁrst section of the present
paper. Lewis faces the challenge of the skeptic, and provides a
deﬁnition of knowledge that can, on the one hand, explain why
the skeptic maneuver makes sense, as traditionally discussed in
epistemology, and, on the other hand, the fact that we truly know
many things. The skeptic, by continuously forcing us to look
at alternatives that we had not previously considered, makes us
doubt our ﬁrmest beliefs, and therefore it seems that none of our
beliefs can ever after be secured, so as to be called ‘knowledge.’
Lewis’s strategy allows for our knowledge attributions to be true
before meeting the skeptic, while our post-skeptic knowledge
attributions become false. Meeting the skeptic has exercised a
crucial change in the context, and knowledge attributions become
context sensitive.
Here is Lewis’ deﬁnition:
S knows that P iﬀ P holds in every possibility left uneliminated
by S’s evidence —Psst!— except for those possibilities that we are
properly ignoring (Lewis, 1996, p. 561).
‘S knows that p’ will then be true if every alternative in which
not p is eliminated by S’s evidence. I know that my pen is inside
my bag at 00:35 because I can rule out every possible chain of
events leading up to my pen being elsewhere. I saw it in the bag a
minute ago, lighting conditions are ok, I am under the inﬂuence
of no perception-altering substances, nobody has entered the
room since the last time I saw it in the bag, etc. My evidence
eliminates every possibility in which my pen is not in my bag.
If I know it, my attribution at 00:35 will always be true. But,
‘is that so?’ the skeptic would ask at 00:36, only to introduce
subsequently an exotic alternative, previously ignored, in which
my pen is absent from my bag, an alternative that my current
evidence cannot eliminate. What if everything I see is nothing
but a cleverly produced illusion, conducted by a demon who,
as a matter of fact, happens to have my pen in his hand? I can
no longer truly say that I know that my pen is in my bag, since
my evidence tells me nothing about the existence of that demon.
How can my attributions diﬀer so drastically in a minute? Lewis’s
response is that the clever skeptic makes it inappropriate to ignore
certain possibilities. It was true at 00:35 that I knew that my pen
was in the bag, and it is also true that I do not know at 00:36 that
my pen is in the bag. Being sometimes susceptible to the reasons
of the skeptic does not make me an illogical person.
The context alters the content of the epistemic attribution by
changing the alternatives that can properly be ignored, and so it
does in a tacit way (thus, Lewis’s ‘psst’). Crucially, the context
does not modify any of the subsentential items of the sentence,
to make it ﬁt into the conversational occasion. Lewis’s context-
dependence of knowledge attributions can be accommodated
only within the organic model, one in which we start by looking at
the conditions under which a particular judgment, my knowledge
attribution in this case, makes sense.
Frege, one of the founding ﬁgures of semantic analysis, and
therefore an unavoidable reference for current alternatives within
the philosophy of language, also assumed the organic model of
individuation as the backbone of his logic and semantic proposal.
It would be a disservice to restrict Frege’s organic inclinations
to his ﬁrst works. Not only did he maintain them in his ﬁrst
signiﬁcant works, but he also took sides with the principle of
context until the end of his career.
The project of deﬁning the concept ‘number’ in ‘Grundlagen’
is an illustration of the organic procedure. Frege exposed the
ﬂaws of the classical strategy of deﬁning numbers by putting
‘units’ together and shifted to a diﬀerent method: ‘It should throw
some light on the matter to consider number in the context of
a judgment which brings its basic use’ (Frege, 1884/1960, §46,
p. 59). This is an application of the second principle that he
introduced in the prolog of this work and that deﬁned his logico-
semantic project, ‘never to ask for the meaning of a word in
isolation, but only in the context of a proposition’ (p. xxii), the
principle of context that shaped the development of logic and
semantics ever since.
The principle of context is a rich indication that can be
understood as making a point about the contextually modulated
meaning of the words in a sentence, or else as a statement
about the logical priority of propositions over concepts. The ﬁrst
reading, which has become the centerpiece of several varieties
of contextualism, elaborates it in the notion of modulation of
meaning (vid. Recanati, 2004, p. 39 and ﬀ.). It is nevertheless the
second reading that characterizes the organic model. To avoid
misunderstandings, we will call this second reading the Principle
of Propositional Priority: [Principle of Propositional Priority]
Propositions are the primary bearers of logical, semantic, and
pragmatic properties.
Two judgments, Frege explains (Frege, 1879, §3), can diﬀer in
two ways: (i) From the two of them together with a certain set of
premises, the same set of consequences follows. (ii) Alternatively,
the sets of their consequences might not coincide. In the ﬁrst case,
the two judgments have the same content; in the second case,
their contents are diﬀerent. A propositional content, the content
of a possible judgment, is thus individuated by the contents that
follow from it (together with some auxiliary information). In
this model, subsentential and subpropositional elements play no
essential role in content individuation. As Frege put it:
Let us assume that the circumstance that hydrogen is lighter
than carbon dioxide is expressed in our formula language, we
can then replace the sign for hydrogen by the sign for oxygen
or that for nitrogen. This changes the meaning in such a way
that ‘oxygen’ or ‘nitrogen’ enters into the relations in which
‘hydrogen’ stood before. If we imagine that an expression can thus
be altered, it decomposes into a stable component, representing
the totality of relations, and the sign, regarded as replaceable by
others, that denotes the object standing in these relations. The
former component I call a function, the latter its argument. The
distinction has nothing to do with the conceptual content; it comes
about only because we view the expression in a particular way (our
italics; Frege, 1879, p. 22).
Frege’s approach to the other classical principle, the Principle
of Compositionality, is patent in this text. The interpretation
of the principle that characterizes the building block model
takes it as a criterion of propositional individuation in which
propositions are complex entities made up of simpler parts. We
claim, nevertheless, that this is not Frege’s interpretation. The
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organic model is compatible with a view of compositionality
as a method of propositional analysis, not as a criterion
of propositional individuation. A single proposition can be
expressed by diﬀerent sentences, which open up diverse
possibilities of propositional analysis. Even if propositions are,
in the organic model, non-structured entities, the structure of
sentences can be projected, for the sake of a particular analytic
aim, onto the propositional contents expressed by them. This
fact should not make us forget that there is a sharp distinction
between the ontological characterization of propositions as
structured entities build up on blocks, on the one hand, and
the semantic project of assigning semantic values to expressions
in a sentence, on the other. Lewis (1980)3 is an example of the
defense of the organic model of propositional individuation and
the compositional approach to the semantic value of expressions.
That the classical building-block interpretation of
compositionality is alien to Frege’s thought is no news any more.
It has been defended by (Jansen, 2001) and (Pelletier, 2001),
among others. In what follows we will oﬀer new evidences4.
From the principle of propositional priority follows one
of Frege’s longstanding insights, one that plays a particularly
relevant role in this paper and that is the core of the organic
model: it makes no sense to admit the possibility that there might
be diﬀerent, yet analytically equivalent, thoughts, an insight, we
contend, that is not compatible with the building-block model.
Furthermore, as a deﬁning feature of the organic approach to
propositions, it serves as a test to set apart two essentially
distinct uses of context, as we will do in the next section of
this paper. If propositional contents are organically individuated,
analytically equivalent sentences express the same proposition.
This claim amounts to a rejection of a possible isomorphism
between sentences and the propositions expressed by them, and
is a major consequence of the organic model. In Frege’s writings
the rejection of the isomorphism between sentences and thoughts
is represented by his move toward contents by overlooking the
grammatical surface of judgments. Languages serve thoughts to
get ‘clothed in the perceptible garb of a sentence’ (Frege, 1918–
1919a, p. 354) and can be used ‘as a bridge from the perceptible
to the imperceptible’ (Frege, 1923–1926, p. 259). Nevertheless,
cloth and ﬂesh, the perceptible and the imperceptible maintain
their independence, and the principle of propositional priority
establishes which one takes the lead. In ‘Logical Generality’
(Frege, 1923–1926), for instance, Frege says: ‘We should not
overlook the deep gulf that yet separates the level of language
from that of the thought, and which imposes certain limits on the
3“The less I have said about what so-called semantic values must be, the more I am
entitled to insist on what I did say. If they don’t obey the compositional principle,
they are not what I call semantic values” (Lewis, 1980, p. 91).
4Reverse Compositionality (Fodor, 1998, cfr. Szabó, 2013) is no better candidate
to do justice to Frege’s ideas on this issue. If the principle is interpreted as a sort
semantic version of “reverse engineering,” then it is incompatible with the Fregean
stance regarding the fact that multiple logical forms can result from the analysis of
a single judgment. If it only amounts to the platitude that whatever the analysis of
a judgment, the ﬁnal components should be somehow related to the whole, then
it is both compatible with the organic and the building-block models. Similarly, if
it is only meant as ‘a statistical psychological generalization that holds with great
regularity’ (Johnson, 2006, p. 52), then Reverse Compositionality is not particularly
useful when discussing content individuation.
mutual correspondence of the two levels’ (Frege, 1923, p. 259).
Passive transformation becomes one of his favorite examples.
From ‘Begriﬀsschrift’ to ‘Logical Investigations,’ he resorts to it
to show that non-synonymous sentences (in the standard sense)
can systematically be used to elicit the same thought:
A sentence can be transformed by changing the verb from
active to passive and at the same time making the accusative
into the subject. In the same way we may change the dative into
the nominative and at the same time replace ‘give’ with ‘receive.’
Naturally such transformations are not trivial in every respect;
but they do not touch the thought, they do not touch what is true
or false (Frege, 1918–1919a, p. 357).
But passivization is not the only case. Frege’s substitution
mechanism to determine the contribution of subsentential
expressions is a further example of his use of context, a
mechanism that Brandom takes over to explain the inferential
function of singular terms and predicates (Brandom, 2001, Chap.
4 passim). ‘Frege was the ﬁrst,’ Brandom concedes, ‘to use
distinctions such as these to characterize the roles of singular
terms and predicates. Frege’s idea is that predicates are the
substitutional sentence frames formed when singular terms are
substituted for in sentences’ (Brandom, 2001, p. 131).
An example of a diﬀerent sort that nevertheless illustrates the
same point occurs in the realm of logic. Logical terms mean
unsaturated notions whose arguments can be sentences, truth-
values or thoughts, depending on the perspective we take on
them. In particular, thoughts can be compounded to form more
complex ones by means of logical operations. Nevertheless, the
logical operations applied to sets of thoughts can be rendered
in natural and logical languages through sentences with diﬀerent
ingredients. The thought expressed by any instance of the schema
‘(A & A)’ is the thought expressed by the corresponding instance
of ‘A’ (Frege, 1923–1926, p. 393, n. 21). The thought expressed
by any instance of the schema ‘Not [(not A) and (not B)],’ is
the thought expressed by the corresponding instances of ‘Not
[Neither A not B]’ and by the corresponding instances of ‘A or
B’ (Frege, 1923–1926, p. 396).
Thus, even if Frege explicitly uses the building-block image (as
in Frege, 1914, p. 225), he takes the idea that thoughts are made
out of simpler parts that correspond to the parts of the sentences
metaphorically. In ‘On Sense and Meaning’ he says:
Here, I have used the word ‘part’ in a special sense. I have in
fact transferred the relation between the parts and the whole of
the sentence to its meaning, by calling the meaning of a word
part of the meaning of the sentence, if the word itself is a part
of the sentence. This way of speaking can certainly be attacked,
because the total meaning and one part of it do not suﬃce to
determine the remainder, and because the word ‘part’ is already
used of bodies in another sense. A special term would need to be
invented (Frege, 1892, p. 165).
At the end of his life, Frege still maintains the same view:
If one thought contradicts another, then from a sentence
whose sense is the one it is easy to construct a sentence expressing
the other. Consequently the thought that contradicts another
thought appears as made up of that thought and negation [. . .].
But the words ‘made up of,’ ‘consists of,’ ‘component,’ ‘part’ may
lead to our looking at it the wrong way. If we choose to speak of
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parts in this connection, all the same these parts are not mutually
independent in the way that we are elsewhere used to ﬁnd when
we have parts of a whole’ (Frege, 1918–1919b, p. 386).
In summary, the Fregean principle of propositional priority
introduces a way of individuating propositional contents that
makes an idiosyncratic use of context, a use that cannot be
accommodated in any of the contemporary positions that attempt
to harbor the eﬀect of contextual factors in what is said. The
Fregean organic model and the compositionalist model that
serves as a background for the theories depicted in the ﬁrst
section of this paper stand in sharp contrast with profound
philosophical consequences5. The two models are incompatible,
as we will show in the next section.
EXPRESSIVISM AND THE ORGANIC
MODEL
It is the purpose of this section to show that contemporary
expressivism, at least in the way in which some of its most popular
varieties are commonly understood, is incompatible with the
building-block model. We do so by focusing on the expressivist’s
commitment with the idea, mentioned in the previous section,
that there cannot be diﬀerent, and yet analytically equivalent,
propositions. In so doing, we will argue for a somewhat
controversial statement (see, for example Field, 2009, p. 252) that
we introduced in the ﬁrst section of the paper – that MacFarlane’s
assessment relativism, as a representative of the building-block
model, needs to be sharply distinguished from expressivism, a
paradigmatic example of the organic model.
Classical Expressivism analyzes sentences with ethical terms,
such as ‘cheating on your husband is bad,’ as having the
general import of ‘boo for cheating!,’ i.e., as interjections
devoid of propositional content that cannot qualify as true or
false. Contemporary expressivism, by contrast, acknowledges
an evaluable content, organically individuated, to acts with
expressive terms. The ‘expressivist’ strategy,’ as Gibbard puts it ‘is
to change the question. Don’t ask directly how to deﬁne ‘good’. . .
shift the question to focus on judgments: ask, say, what judging
that is good consists in’ (Gibbard, 2003, p. 6). This pattern applies
to a wide variety of topics. Gibbard (2012) applies it to semantics,
Chrisman and Field to knowledge ascriptions (Chrisman, 2007,
2012; Field, 2009; Carter and Chrisman, 2012), Bar-On to ﬁrst-
person ascriptions (Bar-On, 2004), and so on.
In an expressivist setting, the content of normative claims is
individuated organically. Higher-order functions, functions like
‘is wrong,’ ‘is good,’ ‘S knows that,’ ‘S believes that,’ or ‘necessarily,’
are non-truth-conditional functions that do not describe how the
5It might perhaps be surprising for some not to ﬁnd a mention in this section
of Donald Davidson, one of the best-known champions of the cause against
the organic model. The reason for this is that we wanted to avoid any possible
confusion between holism, Davidson’s own brand of anti-building-block theory,
and expressivism, which is the target of this paper. The kind of contemporary
expressivism that we explore in this paper is diﬀerent from holism –and from
‘global expressivism’ (Price, 2011), or inferentialism– at least in two crucial aspects:
expressivism is not committed to the idea that every expression needs to receive an
organic analysis, and expressivism does not need to accept that every inference is a
meaning-determining inference (cfr. Gibbard, 2012, p. 109 and ﬀ.).
world is. Some of these functions are functions of propositions
whose semantic role does not consist in adding a conceptual
component to the propositional content of the communicative
act in which they are used. For those, expressivists like Gibbard
(2012, p. 179) propose an oblique approach – by focusing on
the mental states that are expressed by the use of normative
utterances, inferential relations of entailment and incompatibility
are exposed, and these are the touchstone of the expressivist
analysis.
So far, the characterization of the meaning of functions of
propositions is negative: they are non-truth-conditional, non-
descriptive, non-contributive. But if they do not describe the
world and do not contribute to the proposition, what semantic
role do they perform? How are they individuated? A temptation
for many expressivists, old and new, is to identify the meaning
of the relevant terms with some kind of mental state, attitude
or feeling. An example is Gibbard (1990): ‘According to any
expressivistic analysis, to call something rational is not, in the
strict sense, to attribute a property to it. It is to do something
else: to express a state of mind’ (Gibbard, 1990, p. 9). But,
as we argued in (Frápolli and Villanueva, 2012, p. 485), this
is unnecessary, ‘since the meaning of these expressions is
exhausted once their inferential potential is indicated.’ A look
at this inferential potential makes it apparent that normative
expressions are distinctively connected with other expressions
that include functions of propositions – they entail some, they are
incompatible with some others, and that these connections suﬃce
to explain their semantico-pragmatic behavior. In the next few
paragraphs, we sketch the kind of minimal expressivist analysis
of functions of propositions that we have developed in Frápolli
and Villanueva (2012).
To give the meaning of ‘S believes that p’ – we consider
modal, but also doxastic and epistemic, attributions to belong
to the realm of the normative – is to identify the circumstances
under which an agent is entitled to utter this sentence, and
the consequences that can be derived from the attribution. It
is constitutive of the meaning of ‘believe’ that an agent cannot
attribute to a subject the belief that p and at the same time the
belief that p cannot be true. This is the standard truth norm.
Attributing beliefs to an agent commits the attributor to the
further attribution of plans to act according to his/her beliefs.
If we attribute to Victoria the belief that she is late for work, we
should attribute to her the intention to leave immediately (even if
factors preclude her from acting in this way).
Similarly, the meaning of ‘know’ is such that if an agent
attributes to a subject the knowledge that p, the agent will be
committed to the truth of p. Attributing the knowledge of p
is incompatible with our belief that p is false. As M. Williams
puts it, ‘in attributing knowledge to another person, I concede
both the truth of what he believes and his right to believe it.
And in advancing this double endorsement, I take on the same
commitments and lay claim to the same entitlements’ (Williams,
2001, p. 17). Knowledge and belief are diﬀerent concepts because
the conditions for their use and the commitments acquired by
their attribution do not coincide.
The same can be said of pairs of logical terms such as ‘or’
and ‘and.’ Utterances of ‘Yum likes licorice and Yuk dislikes
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it’ and ‘Yum likes licorice or Yuk dislikes it’ express diﬀerent
contents because the latter, unlike the former one, is compatible
with the assertion that Yum dislikes licorice. Conjunction and
disjunction are distinct concepts because they derive from, and
produce, distinct permissions and prohibitions, i.e., because
they sanction divergent behavioral responses. Generality and
instantiation likewise give rise to diﬀerent permissions and
commitments. A rational agent cannot believe that an individual
x has the property P and at the same time reject that something
is P, for Px and It is not the case that there is a P express
incompatible contents. On the other hand, if two expressions
systematically give rise to the same set of commitments and
share the circumstances under which they can be properly used,
they also share their content. One might feel that the meanings
of ‘every’ and ‘all’ are slightly diﬀerent. In fact, they are not
universally interchangeable salva congruitate. But if there is no
detectable diﬀerence in claiming that every child likes football and
all children like football in terms of the agent’s entitlements and
commitments, there is just one proposition expressed by the two
claims. And the same happens with the following sentences,
‘tame tigers exist,’
‘some tigers are tame,’
‘there are tigers that are tame,’ and
‘not all tigers are not tame.’
These sentences are not isomorphically identical; some words
occur in some of them and not in others, and they do not possess
the same structure. But the inferential moves that would be made
by the use of any of them in a communicative act would not be
aﬀected by the replacement of any one by any of the others, for
nothing follows from any of them that does not follow from the
others too.
Now it should be patent that the expressivist approach hinted
at so far falls within the organic model. The content of the
set of expressions to which the expressivist analysis applies is
individuated by reference to the inferential links granted or
precluded by assertions in which they occur, rather than by
factoring in the modulated meanings of subsentential items. This
minimal brand of expressivism we take to be compatible with
the core of major contemporary expressivist approaches, and the
features that make this position an example of the organic model
belong to this common core6.
Our claim about the organic nature of the expressivist
enterprise will be now assessed with the aid of the test that we
introduced in the previous sections. Expressivism is naturally
committed to the idea that there cannot be diﬀerent, but
analytically equivalent, propositions, and this tenet has been
put to use as a premise by John MacFarlane in an argument
to undermine the expressivist analysis of predicates of personal
taste. We will show how, even though he is right in attributing
that principle to the expressivist, his argument does not work.
6Please note that our claims concerning expressivism and relativism, but also the
building-block model and the organic model, concern only the individuation of
content. Thus we take them to be for the most part orthogonal with respect to the
much debated issue of the identity of propositions. Our goal is to explore when two
contents diﬀer, rather than to establish what propositions are.
In the process, the crucial diﬀerence between expressivism and
relativism will become apparent.
John MacFarlane has, in recent years, developed an analysis of
predicates of personal taste that makes them context-dependent
but that also diﬀers from most previously known versions
of contextualism. According to MacFarlane, what makes these
predicates special is that they require the intervention, at a post-
semantic level, of certain information that can be gathered only
from the context of assessment – rather than the context of
utterance. Even if it was true when originally produced, I can
retract my claim that ‘licorice is not tasty’ because I am assessing
it now in a diﬀerent context. With this, MacFarlane manages to
oﬀer an alternative both to objectivism – the idea that claims that
contain predicates of personal taste are true or false simpliciter
– as well as to contextualism – the idea that every taste claim
involves a reference to a set of taste standards. Expressivism,
MacFarlane posits, can nevertheless be developed into a position
on the matter that looks dangerously close to his own assessment
relativism. Not so close, though, that it cannot be diﬀerentiated
from it, and evaluated accordingly like a diﬀerent theory.
Relativism and expressivism would oﬀer similar treatments
of descriptive beliefs, which are individuated in terms of
compatibility and incompatibility among mental states
(MacFarlane, 2014, p. 170). The conﬂict would arise when
assessment-sensitive beliefs are considered. In these cases,
MacFarlane’s reconstruction of the expressivist position would
oﬀer an indirect characterization of beliefs via the language of
preference. In such an expressivist framework, to attribute to
someone the belief that licorice is tasty would be to attribute
to that individual ‘the very same kind of state’ (MacFarlane,
2014, p. 173) that we would make the attribution by saying
that he/she likes licorice. By contrast, McFarlane’s relativism
rejects the contention that beliefs with taste-relative contents
can be identiﬁed with any ‘state we could attribute using the
language of preference’ (ibid.). ‘Why might it matter whether
there is one state or two?’ he asks. And his answer brings into the
open a qualitative diﬀerence between the two accounts: for an
expressivist it is ‘conceptually impossible to think that something
whose taste one knows ﬁrst-hand is tasty while not liking its
taste.’ This, MacFarlane argues, would be going too far:
The relativist [. . .] can agree that the questions are ‘not
separate’ in the following sense: ﬁrst-person deliberation about
each gets resolved by the same considerations. It does not
follow from this, however, that the questions concern the same
psychological state (MacFarlane, 2014, p. 174).
In other words, a ﬁrst-person avowal of a belief with the
content that licorice is tasty is practically indistinguishable from
a claim to the eﬀect that the speaker likes its taste. But even so,
an agent who is working hard to improve his/her taste standards
could make sense of a situation in which he/she still likes licorice
but would be willing to accept that it might not be tasty after all.
And clearly, a subject who assesses these avowals can mark the
ﬁrst one as saying something false while ascribing truth to the
second claim.
Thinking that we like the taste of something having a taste
we know ﬁrst-hand, and thinking that something is tasty are
conceptually, i.e., analytically, equivalent, and yet, MacFarlane
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1788
Frápolli and Villanueva Expressivism, Relativism, and the Analytic Equivalence Test
argues, an agent can be in a position in which it is not irrational
to attribute one but not the other. Only MacFarlane’s own
assessment relativism can account for this fact. Expressivism, no
matter how close to relativism it might appear, is necessarily
committed to the opposite idea. McFarlane’s remarks disclose
an irresoluble conﬂict with expressivism that can be expressed
in terms of the two models of content-individuation described
in the foregoing sections of the present paper. If McFarlane’s
diagnosis is accurate, relativism and expressivism come apart
at this deeper level, and, to the despair of the proponents of
the organic model, there is something intuitively correct in the
idea that one might acknowledge that something is tasty without
liking its taste herself.
Thus, once it is assumed that the building-block model and the
organic model can be used to spell out the diﬀerences between
such close views as assessment relativism and expressivism,
MacFarlane’s arguments could be taken even a step further, to
use them against the whole organic model. If ‘Licorice is tasty’
and ‘I know the taste of licorice ﬁrst-hand and I do like it’ are
analytically equivalent, but it can be rational to believe one but
not the other, maybe it is inappropriate as a general policy to
claim that there cannot be diﬀerent but analytically equivalent
propositions. We close this paper by providing some evidence in
favor of the organic take, arguing (i) that ‘Licorice is tasty’ and
‘I know the taste of licorice ﬁrst-hand and I do like it’ are not
analytically equivalent within the organic model, and (ii) that,
with respect to those sentences that are declared to be analytically
equivalent by the organic model, it is indeed irrational to believe
one but not the other. A crucial aspect of our argument is the
rejection, already mentioned, of the idea that the job of sentences
like ‘Licorice is tasty’ and ‘I know the taste of licorice ﬁrst-hand
and I do like it’ is to voice mental states. We are willing to accept,
as both McFarlane and Gibbard do, that the state of mind that
makes an agent utter any of them might be identical. But it does
not follow from this that they are analytically equivalent. Their
meanings do not equate to the expression of feelings or attitudes
but they are instead individuated by the inferential commitments
that a speaker acquires when uttering them, commitments that
belong to the public sphere and for which what happens in the
agent’s head is strictly irrelevant.
The general question underlying the conﬂict does not have an
easy answer. Whether it makes sense to accept that two contents
can be diﬀerent even if the sentences by means of which we
systematically express them are analytically equivalent crucially
depends on the kinds of concepts involved. For ordinary ﬁrst-
level sentences, i.e., the kinds of sentences that express what
Ramsey calls beliefs of the ‘primary sort’ (Ramsey, 1929, p. 146)
and Boole and Frege ‘primary propositions’ (Frege, 1880–1881,
p. 14), the possibility of ﬁnding cases of the kind put forward
by Benson Mates (Mates, 1952), always seems open. Under the
organic model, as we examined in Section “Propositional Priority
and the Organic Model,” content is individuated inferentially,
but that does not mean that no mechanism can be devised to
check whether or not two particular linguistic items, sentential
or subsentential, express the same content. Whenever two
expressions are not interchangeable salva veritate, it is proved
that their inferential behavior crucially diﬀer, and therefore
cannot be taken to express the same content. Mates’ cases are a
particularly telling way to explore the inferential content of pairs
of expressions.
(1a) Nobody doubts that, whoever believes that
ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists, believes that
ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists.
(1b) Nobody doubts that, whoever believes that
ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists, believes that
ophthalmologists are oculists.
(2a) Nobody doubts that, whoever believes that licorice is tasty,
believes that licorice is tasty.
(2b) Nobody doubts that, whoever believes that licorice is tasty,
believes that he/she knows the taste of licorice ﬁrst-hand and
likes it.
While it still makes sense to ask whether 1b could be false,
the truth of 1a goes unquestioned. ‘Being an ophthalmologist’
and ‘being an oculist’ are not, as a consequence, analytically
equivalent. Comparing 2a and 2b oﬀers a similar result. While
2a is obviously true, the truth of 2b can be challenged. A person
attending a wine-testing course might be rational to think
that he/she likes the taste of a certain wine while not thinking
that it is tasty. This would not show that two analytically
equivalent sentences can be rationally entertained as diﬀerent,
and therefore that expressivism fails. Rather, this would only
show that expressivism – or MacFarlane’s reconstruction of it
as applied to taste predicates – had gone too far in claiming
that those two thoughts are analytically equivalent. Within an
expressivist-organic approach it makes perfect sense to think that
licorice is not tasty, while still liking its taste, because ‘Licorice
is tasty’ and ‘I know the taste of licorice ﬁrst-hand and I do like
it’ are not analytically equivalent. Thus 2a and 2b prove that
they have diﬀerent inferential import. MacFarlane’s insistence on
‘Licorice is tasty’ and ‘I know the taste of licorice ﬁrst-hand and
I do like it’ being analytically equivalent, in spite of their distinct
inferential behavior, only conﬁrms that his assessment relativism
belongs to the building-block model. The expressivist does not
need to shy away from MacFarlane’s argument precisely because
organic content individuation is incompatible with the claim
that ‘Licorice is tasty’ and ‘I know the taste of licorice ﬁrst-hand
and I do like it’ have the same content – they are not analytically
equivalent. In fact, MacFarlane’s claim that they are is only
possible if relativism falls outside the sphere of the organic model.
‘Being an ophthalmologist,’ like ‘being tasty,’ are ﬁrst-order
predicates. Expressivism, we have claimed, is nevertheless
essentially concerned with functions of propositions. Modal,
epistemic, doxastic operators, along with ethical terms and
logical constants were among the examples that we oﬀered to
characterize the view as an instantiation of the organic model.
In fact, Frege’s examples, the ones that we introduced in order
to argue for the idea that an organic individuation of content was
incompatible with the existence of analytically equivalent, and yet
diﬀerent, propositions, involved a diﬀerence only in functions of
propositions – logical constants, or the operation of passivization.
Using the Mates test to check on sentences diﬀering only at the
level of functions of propositions proves to oﬀer striking results:
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(3a) Nobody doubts that, whoever believes that p, believes that
p.
(3b) Nobody doubts that, whoever believes that p, believes that
p.
(4a) Nobody doubts that, whoever believes that lawyers are
wealthy, believes that lawyers are wealthy.
(4b) Nobody doubts that, whoever believes that lawyers are
wealthy, believes that it is not the case that lawyers are not
wealthy.
(4c) Nobody doubts that, whoever believes that lawyers are
wealthy and researchers are poor, believes that it is not the
case that lawyers are not wealthy or that researchers are not
poor.
Sentences 3a and 4a are trivially true. But, contrary to what
happens with 1b and 2b, sentences 3b, 4b, and 4c also appear
to be unquestionably true. A rational agent cannot attribute the
belief that lawyers are wealthy without attributing the belief that
it is not the case that lawyers are not wealthy. Otherwise the
agent would display serious rationality ﬂaws. Those who reject
4c remove themselves from the community of rational agents. In
these cases, what is in question is not lexical mastery but the basic
understanding of the rules of language.
Concerning functions of propositions, our intuitions agree
with the predictions of the organic model. Rational agents cannot
believe that Alan is an expressivist, without believing that it
is true that Alan is an expressivist, for what is at stake is a
single belief not two beliefs tightly connected. The same content
is expressed by the sentences ‘it is not the case that Alan is
not an expressivist,’ and ‘Alan is an expressivist or Alan is an
expressivist.’
CONCLUSION
MacFarlane’s assessment relativism is necessarily diﬀerent
from any sensible reconstruction of an expressivist position.
The expressivist is committed to the organic model, while
MacFarlane’s position illustrates the building-block approach. He
is right that it is easy to imagine situations in which ‘Licorice
is not tasty’ and ‘I know the taste of licorice ﬁrst-hand and I
do like it’ can be thought at the same time, about the same
licorice, without the thinker being irrational, but that only shows
that ‘Licorice is tasty’ and ‘I know the taste of licorice ﬁrst-hand
and I do like it’ are not analytically equivalent. Whenever real
analytically equivalent cases can be found within the organic
model, as in 3a to 4c, it is irrational to attribute one but not the
other.
The two models can be discriminated by the analytic-
equivalence test. The negative answer to the question whether
analytically equivalent sentences always express the same
proposition characterizes the building-block model of content
individuation. The positive answer is the semantic core of
the organic model. In the dispute between McFarlane and
Gibbard, there is an essential mismatch that underlies their local
disagreement about the identiﬁcation of normative contents with
expressions of mental states, which classiﬁes either view under
a diﬀerent model. McFarlane is a representative of the building-
block model, while Gibbard represents the organic model. Their
views are thus more dissimilar than what meets the eye. Both
models have strengths and weaknesses and at the level of ﬁrst-
order contents the two parties propose possibly compatible
accounts. Nevertheless, when functions of propositions are
involved, the analytic-equivalence test settles the issue for the
organic model. Only the organic model agrees with the speakers’
intuitions and thus it is the only one appropriate for the
analysis of higher-order functions, in general, and functions of
propositions, in particular. We might reject that the speakers’
intuition plays any role in the analysis of meaning, as the
proponents of the various error theories do, but this move would
take the study of language away from the game of science. We
chose the empirical path in ‘Minimal Expressivism’ (Frápolli
and Villanueva, 2012) by assuming that semantic hypotheses on
the behavior of functions of propositions were, in this sense, a
posteriori. The analytic-equivalence test adjudicates between the
principle of compositionality and the principle of propositional
priority and conﬁrms that when higher-order concepts are at
stake, expressivism is the correct approach.
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